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Memory verification is crucial for meaningful behavior. Orbito-
frontal damage may impair verification and induce confabulation
and inappropriate acts. The strategic retrieval account explains this
state by deficient monitoring of memories’ precise content,
whereas the reality filter hypothesis explains it by a failure of an
orbitofrontal mechanism suppressing the interference of memories
that do not pertain to reality. The distinctiveness of these
mechanisms has recently been questioned. Here, we juxtaposed
these 2 mechanisms using high-resolution evoked potentials in
healthy subjects who performed 2 runs of a continuous recognition
task which contained pictures that precisely matched or only
resembled previous pictures. We found behavioral and electro-
physiological dissociation: Strategic content monitoring was
maximally challenged by stimuli resembling previous ones,
whereas reality filtering was maximally challenged by identical
stimuli. Evoked potentials dissociated at 200--300 ms: Strategic
monitoring induced a strong frontal negativity and a distinct cortical
map configuration, which were particularly weakly expressed in
reality filtering. Recognition of real repetitions was expressed at
300--400 ms, associated with ventromedial prefrontal activation.
Thus, verification of a memory’s concordance with the past (its
content) dissociates from the verification of its concordance with
the present. The role of these memory control mechanisms in the
generation of confabulations and disorientation is discussed.
Keywords: exclusion paradigm, extinction capacity, reward processing,
orbitofrontal cortex, feeling of rightness, inverse solution, source monitoring,
spatiotemporal analysis
Introduction
Brain damage may induce a state in which patients confabulate
experiences of events that never happened, are disoriented
regarding time, place, and their current role, and forge plans for
the day that disregard their current health status. The study of
this state, variably called spontaneous confabulation (Schnider,
von Da¨niken, et al. 1996b), confabulation with action (Metcalf
et al. 2007), or behaviorally spontaneous confabulation
(Schnider 2008), has indicated ways to elucidate the brain
processes allowing humans to sense the veracity of memories
about the past (‘‘Have I really done this this morning?’’) and
their appropriateness as a basis for present action (‘‘Do I really
have this appointment today?’’).
Diverse theories postulated the existence of monitoring pro-
cesses verifying whether a memory about the past is correct or not
(Moscovitch 1989; Johnson et al. 1993; Burgess and Shallice 1996).
While functional imaging opened the way to localization of
the hypothesized processes (Mitchell and Johnson 2009), the
consequences of their failure, and hence, their clinical impact, has
not been experimentally veriﬁed or then received negative
results (Johnson et al. 1997). The main exception to this rule is
thestrategic retrievalhypothesis thatdescribesa seriesofprocesses,
including their anatomical substrate, leading from the evocation of
a memory to the veriﬁcation (‘‘monitoring’’) and the ‘‘felt-rightness’’
about the acceptance or rejection of its content (Moscovitch and
Melo 1997; Gilboa et al. 2006). The theory has received empirical
support fromclinical studies (MoscovitchandMelo1997;Meloet al.
1999; Gilboa et al. 2006): Confabulating patients produced more
false memories when asked to recall personal or historical events
(from the past) evoked by a cue word or when recalling bible
stories. In a continuous recognition task, they accepted pictures
resembling previously presented pictures more often as true
repetitions than nonconfabulating patients (Gilboa et al. 2006).
Only a fraction of patients who recount false ideas about the
past also have false ideas about their present duties (Schnider
2008). These patients act according to currently inappropriate
memories and may, for example, insist on going to appoint-
ments that, in reality, have taken place some years ago
(Schnider, von Da¨niken, et al. 1996b). Thus, they act on the
basis of memories that do not relate to the present. The reality
ﬁlter hypothesis is meant to explain the capacity to distinguish
between memories that relate to current reality and memories
that do not, that is, fantasies (Schnider 2003, 2008). It holds
that the ability to sort out memories that relate to ongoing
reality depends on a ﬁlter mechanism mediated by the
posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex (area 13) (Schnider, von
Da¨niken, et al. 1996a; Schnider and Ptak 1999; Schnider, Treyer,
and Buck 2000; Treyer et al. 2003, 2006b), which ﬁlters
upcoming memories that do not relate to ongoing reality at an
early stage of evocation, at 200--300 ms, before their precise
content is consciously recognized and re-encoded at 400--600
ms (Schnider et al. 2002). The main experimental paradigm
used in these studies—with designs adapted to the used
technology—contained repeated runs of a continuous recogni-
tion test, whereby each run was composed of the same picture
set that was presented in different order each time. Subjects had
to indicate for each picture whether it had already been
presented within the ongoing run, irrespective of presentation
in a previous run. In such tasks, behaviorally spontaneous con-
fabulators produced more and more false-positive responses
from run to run, believing they had just seen an item in the
current run (the ‘‘current reality’’) when, in fact, it had occurred
in a previous run (Schnider, von Da¨niken, et al. 1996a, 1996b;
Schnider and Ptak 1999; Schnider, Ptak, et al. 2000).
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A recent article suggested that reality ﬁltering is a sub-
component of strategic retrieval rather than a different process
(Gilboa et al. 2006), thus questioning the speciﬁcity of reality
ﬁltering (Schnider 2008). The proposal is of importance
because it suggests a convergence of rather than dissociation
between memory control mechanisms. In terms of experimen-
tal approach, it was postulated that the ability to sense that an
item seen in a previous run has not yet occurred within the
‘‘present reality’’ of the ongoing run (reality ﬁltering) would be
related to the ability to sense that an item is not exactly the
same as an item previously presented within the same run
(strategic monitoring).
The fact that the strategic monitoring hypothesis and the
reality ﬁlter hypothesis have deﬁned experimental procedures
associated with them allows one to directly compare the 2
mechanisms. In the present study, we combined the 2
experimental conditions into one recognition paradigm. Using
high-density evoked potentials and spatiotemporal analyses in
healthy subjects, we explored whether the monitoring of
a memory’s precise content (strategic monitoring) is reﬂected
in the same or different electrocortical activity than the moni-
toring of a memory’s relation with the ‘‘now’’ (reality ﬁltering).
The task was composed in such a way that it additionally
allowed us to test the precision of reality ﬁltering.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixteen right-handed subjects (13 women and 3 men, age 25.7 ± 3.6
years) with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness gave written
informed consent to participate in this study, which was approved by
the Institutional Ethical Committee.
Methods
Subjects made 3 equivalent blocks composed of 2 runs of a continuous
recognition task, in which they had to indicate picture recurrences
within, and only within, the ongoing run. The 3 blocks were separated
by 10-min breaks (to prevent fatigue) and were composed of separate
picture sets (to prevent interference between the blocks). The 2 runs
of each block were made in immediate succession (60-s break to restart
the presentation program). Data from the ﬁrst runs of the 3 blocks
were pooled for the analyses, as were data from the second runs of the
3 blocks.
Strategic content monitoring was tested as proposed by Gilboa et al.
(2006): All runs were composed in such a way that some pictures (New
items, distracters, Dis) were truly repeated within the run (true
repetitions, Rep), while others were followed by an item that was
semantically identical but structurally only similar with the previously
presented picture (similars, Sim). The distinction between a true
repetition and an item that is only similar to a previously presented
picture (but is indeed a new picture) has been proposed to rely on
strategic monitoring (Gilboa et al. 2006).
Reality ﬁltering was tested by composing the 2 runs within each
block according to the same logic as in our previous studies (Schnider,
von Da¨niken, et al. 1996b; Schnider and Ptak 1999; Schnider 2003,
2008): The second run of each block was composed in the same
manner and of the same item set as the ﬁrst run of the same block.
Thus, the second run demands the ability to sense that an item that
appears familiar (from the ﬁrst run) is indeed new within the ongoing
second run (distracters of run 2, Dis2). Behaviorally spontaneous
confabulators speciﬁcally failed in this capacity (they produced false-
positive responses) (Schnider, von Da¨niken, et al. 1996b; Schnider and
Ptak 1999). Performance of the second run induced circumscribed
activity of orbitofrontal area 13 in healthy subjects (Schnider, Treyer,
and Buck 2000). Processing of the ﬁrst appearance of stimuli in the
second run (Dis2), which had already been seen in the ﬁrst run,
induced a speciﬁc electrocortical response at 200--300 ms thought to
reﬂect reality ﬁltering (Schnider et al. 2002).
An additional question in this study was the precision of the
orbitofrontal reality ﬁlter. To test this aspect, some items of the ﬁrst
runs did not reappear in the identical form in the second runs of the
same block but in a similar form (distracters similar with an item from
the ﬁrst run; SimDis2). Thus, these pictures were new pictures that
were related to, but not identical with, an item seen in the ﬁrst run.
Would these stimuli be processed in the same way as pictures that had
really appeared in the ﬁrst run (Dis2)? If yes, the reality ﬁlter could be
assumed to be relatively imprecise and to be challenged by similar
stimulus variations as strategic monitoring.
Task Composition
The layout of the task is shown in Figure 1. The whole task was
composed of 126 pairs of semantically identical, perceptually related
line drawings (126 pictures, 126 similars). In pretests, 9 healthy subjects
similarly named 100% of the picture pairs and correctly distinguished
94% of them as different pictures in a continuous recognition task.
In each run, 84 pictures were presented. In the ﬁrst runs of each
block, there were 42 ﬁrst presentations (Distracters 1, Dis1), 21 true
repetitions (Repetitions 1, Rep1—recognition of true repetitions) and
21 presentations of similar pictures (Similars 1, Sim1—test of strategic
content monitoring). True repetitions and presentations of similar
pictures occurred after 12--18 intervening pictures. Subjects had to
indicate as fast as possible by button press whether the picture had
been presented before within the ongoing run (right button with right
middle ﬁnger for Rep1) or not (left button with right index ﬁnger for
Dis1 and Sim1).
Figure 1. Task design. Both runs of each block were composed of the same items,
arranged in different order. Distracters are items that appear for the first time within
a run (Dis1, Dis2 5 Distracters of run 1 or 2). Similars resemble a picture previously
seen within the same run (Sim1, Sim2 5 Similars of run 1 or 2). Similar distracters
(SimDis2) appear for the first time within the second run but resemble a picture seen
in the first run. Repetitions are true repetitions within a run (Rep1, Rep2 5
Repetitions within run 1 or 2). The 3 blocks were composed of different pictures
and were separated by a break of 10 min.
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Participants then immediately performed a second run, which was
composed of the same items, mostly represented in the same
pictures, as the ﬁrst run. Again they had to indicate precise picture
repetitions within the second run, irrespective of presentations in the
ﬁrst run. Speciﬁcally, the second runs contained 21 pictures that had
already been presented in the ﬁrst run and now appeared for the ﬁrst
time within the second run (Distracters 2, Dis2—test of reality ﬁlter),
21 pictures that were similar to but not identical with pictures that
had been presented and repeated within the ﬁrst run and now
appeared for the very ﬁrst time in the task (Similar Distracters 2,
SimDis2—test of the precision of the reality ﬁlter), 21 picture
repetitions (Repetitions 2, Rep2), and 21 presentations of pictures
similar to but not identical with a picture already presented within
the second run (Similars 2, Sim2).
Rep2 and Sim2 stimuli had already been seen within the ﬁrst run
(Fig. 1). Thus, they did not pose a deﬁnite cognitive challenge, like the
other stimulus types, but rather combined cognitive requirements of
strategic content monitoring (within run 2) and reality ﬁltering (across
the runs, run 2 vs. run 1). They were included to assure that run 2 had
a similar internal structure (same stimulus types, apart from addition of
SimDis2) and level of difﬁculty as run 1 but were not intended to enter
analysis.
The meaning of the different stimulus types and expected responses
are summarized in Table 1.
As there were 42 Dis1 items per block (126 total), while all other
conditions had 21 stimuli per block (63 total), only half of the
responses to Dis1 stimuli were randomly selected in each subject to
enter analysis.
Stimuli were presented on a computer screen for 2000 ms; inter-
stimulus interval was 700 ms.
Behavioral data (reaction times, correct responses) with the factor
stimulus type were analyzed using repeated-measures analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) and post hoc Fisher’s tests (with a signiﬁcance level
of P < 0.05).
ERP Acquisition and Preprocessing
Electroencephalography was continuously recorded with an Active-
Two Biosemi EEG system (Biosemi V.O.F.) using 128 scalp electrodes.
Signal was sampled at 512 Hz and ﬁltered at bandwidth of 0--104 Hz.
Cartool software (http://brainmapping.unige.ch/Cartool.htm) was used
to conduct all analyses. Epochs from 200 ms prestimulus to 600 ms
poststimulus onset were averaged for each condition and each subject
to calculate the event-related potentials (ERPs). Only correct trials
were retained. In addition to a ±100-lV automated artifact criterion,
data were visually inspected during the averaging procedure to reject
epochs with eye blinks and movements and other sources of transient
noise. ERPs were band-pass ﬁltered to 1--30 Hz and recalculated against
the average reference. Artifact electrodes were interpolated using
a spherical spline interpolation (Perrin et al. 1987). Baseline correction
was applied to the 200-ms prestimulus period before group averaging.
The ﬁrst 600 ms of the ERPs after stimulus onset were retained for
analysis.
Spatiotemporal Analysis
In a ﬁrst step, periods of stable conﬁguration of electrocortical activity
(‘‘maps’’) over the whole set of 128 electrodes were determined using
a segmentation procedure. To this end, a modiﬁed hierarchical cluster
analysis as implemented in Cartool software (topographic atomize and
agglomerate hierarchical clustering) was run across the 5 experimental
conditions Dis1, Sim1, Rep1, Dis 2, and SimDis2 (Michel et al. 2004;
Murray et al. 2008). Statistical smoothing was used to eliminate
temporally isolated maps with low strength (Pascual-Marqui et al.
1995). As additional constraints, scalp topographies of<20 ms duration
were rejected and clusters that correlated >90% were merged. The
number of maps explaining the averaged data sets was determined with
the cross validation and the Krzanowski--Lai criterion (Pascual-Marqui
et al. 1995).
In a second step, the appearance of maps identiﬁed in the group-
averaged data was statistically veriﬁed in the ERPs of the individual
subjects. To do this, each map was compared with the moment-by-
moment scalp topography of the individual subjects’ ERPs from each
condition by strength-independent spatial correlation (Michel et al.
2001, 2009; Murray et al. 2008). That is, for each time point of the
individual subjects’ ERPs, the scalp topography was compared with all
maps and was labeled according to the one with which it best
correlated. It is important to note that this labeling procedure is not
exclusive such that a given period of the ERP for a given subject and
stimulus condition is often labeled with multiple template maps.
Nonetheless, the results of the labeling reveal whether a given ERP is
more often described by one map rather than another. Fitting thus
allowed us to determine for what period of time (duration) a given
topography was observed in a given condition across subjects. The
global explained variance (GEV) is the sum of the explained variance
weighted by the global field power (GFP, root mean square across the
average-referenced electrode values at a given instant in time [Murray
et al. 2008; Michel et al. 2009]). The GFP represents the strength of the
maps. The GEV describes how well a map conﬁguration explains the
individually obtained patterns of activity (Michel et al. 2004; Murray
et al. 2008). The GEV and duration of maps were then subjected to
repeated-measures ANOVAs with the 2 factors Map and Stimulus type
(Dis1, Rep1, Sim1, Dis2, SimDis2) and subjected to Fisher’s post hoc
tests.
In order to estimate the sources of the cluster maps, distributed
linear inverse solution based on a local auto-regressive average model
using a 3D realistic head model with a solution space of 3005 nodes was
applied (Grave de Peralta Menendez et al. 2001, 2004; Michel et al.
2004). Current distribution was calculated within the gray matter of the
average brain provided by the Montreal Neurological Institute. Source
estimation was limited to the time period in which segmentation of
scalp ERP demonstrated signiﬁcantly different map topographies
between stimulus types.
Waveform Analysis
For a more traditional view of the evoked potentials, a waveform
analysis was also conducted. Three regions of interest (ROIs) were
Table 1
Stimulus types and their meaning
Stimulus type Abbreviation Description Correct response (‘‘Repetition?’’) Measured capacity
Distracter 1 Dis1 Picture appearing for the first time within the first run (new) No Novelty detection
Similar 1 Sim1 Picture similar to, but not identical with, a picture previously presented
within the first run
No Strategic content monitoring
Repetition 1 Rep1 Repetition of a picture previously presented within the first run Yes Familiarity judgment (feeling of rightness?)
Similar Distracter 2 SimDis2 First appearance of a picture in the second run resembling a picture seen in
the first run
No Precision of reality filter
Distracter 2 Dis2 First appearance within the second run of a picture which has already
appeared in the first run
No Reality filtering
Similar 2a Sim2 Picture similar to, but not identical with, a picture previously presented
within the second run; already seen both as Dis1 and Rep1 in the first run
No Strategic monitoring plus reality filtering
Repetition 2a Rep2 Repetition of a picture previously presented within the second run; already
seen as Sim1 in the first run
Yes Strategic monitoring (feeling of rightness?)
plus reality filtering
Note: aIndicates stimulus types that did not enter analysis because they did not distinctly reflect strategic content monitoring or reality filtering (Sim2, Rep2).
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selected: frontal (16 most frontal electrodes), central (15 most central
electrodes), and posterior (16 most posterior electrodes) (Dien and
Santuzzi 2005; Fig. 3A). ERPs of the electrodes within each region were
averaged for each condition and each subject. Statistical analysis of
amplitude differences was centered on the time windows in which the
spatial cluster analysis indicated signiﬁcantly different map conﬁgu-
rations (200--250 and 300--400 ms). To allow comparison with
a previous study using a comparable but simpler paradigm (Schnider
et al. 2002), the time window 400--600 ms was also analyzed.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs with the 2 factors ROI (frontal, central,
and posterior) and stimulus type (mean of trace amplitudes of Dis1,
Rep1, Sim1, Dis2, SimDis2) were run across each time period and
subjected to post hoc tests.
Results
Behavioral Results
Table 2 summarizes the behavioral results. There was a signif-
icant effect of stimulus type on accuracy (one-factor ANOVA,
F4,60 = 9.8, P < 0.001) and reaction time (F4,60 = 108.4, P <
0.001). Post hoc tests showed that subjects were signiﬁcantly
less accurate and slower in response to Sim1 items than all
other stimulus types. Conversely, they were faster and more
accurate in response to SimDis2 than Sim1, Rep1, and Dis2.
The stimuli that did not enter the electrophysiological
analysis (Sim2, Rep2) did not differ from their equivalents in
the ﬁrst run (Sim1, Rep1) in terms of accuracy (Table 2). While
Sim2 also had similar reaction times as Sim1, reaction times
were signiﬁcantly longer in response to Rep2 than Rep1 (post
hoc comparison, P < 0.05).
There was no indication of fatigue inﬂuencing performance:
Reaction times (all stimulus types included) were slowest in
the ﬁrst block, then became faster in the second block and
third block (effect of block, F2,30 = 24, P < 0.0001; post hoc,
block 1 > block 2 = block 3). Reaction times did not vary
between the runs (P = 0.7).
Spatiotemporal Analysis
Spatial cluster analysis revealed 8 different cluster maps within
the ﬁrst 600 ms after stimulus onset (Fig. 2A). Temporal
succession of the dominant maps is displayed in Figure 2B.
Between about 200 and 300 ms, this grand mean analysis
suggested that map 2 was less present in response to Dis2 than
in the other conditions. Analysis of map appearance in the
individual data between 180 and 260 ms showed a signiﬁcant
interaction of GEV between maps 2, 4, and 5 and task
conditions (F8,120 = 2.3, P < 0.05). Post hoc tests (Fig. 2C)
conﬁrmed the weaker representation of map 2 in response to
Dis2 than all other conditions except SimDis2 and showed
a stronger representation of this map in response to Sim1
compared with Dis2 and SimDis2 (statistical differences are
showed in Fig. 2C). Fitting of duration of these maps also
showed a signiﬁcant interaction between conditions (F8,120 =
2.8, P < 0.05): map 2 was shorter in Dis2 condition than in
Sim1 condition (P < 0.05). No difference appeared for maps 4
and 5.
Source localization of map 2 (Fig. 2D) indicated that map 2
reﬂects particularly strong activation of temporo-occipital visual
areas and discrete ventromedial prefrontal activation. The
ensuing map 5, on which stimuli did not differ signiﬁcantly, had
much less extended activation of these cortical areas but strong
ventromedial prefrontal (orbitofrontal) activation (Fig. 2D).
Thus, correct processing of items that only resembled
previously presented ones (Sim1), therefore requiring ‘‘strate-
gic monitoring,’’ was associated with particularly widespread
visual and associative cortical activation. Stimuli known from
the previous run but not yet presented within the ongoing
second run (Dis2), therefore requiring ‘‘realty ﬁltering,’’ were
associated with the weakest activation of these neocortical
areas in the 180- to 260-ms period; they essentially left out this
neocortical processing stage.
Between 300 and 400 ms after stimulus onset, Figure 2B
shows a speciﬁc map (map 6) in response to Rep1. Statistical
analysis yielded a signiﬁcant interaction of map 3 stimulus type
between maps 5, 6, 7, and 8 and task conditions regarding GEV
(F12,180 = 3.3, P < 0.001) and map duration (F12,180 = 3.5,
P <0.001). Figure 2C shows that map 6 was more present (GEV)
in response to Rep1 than to Dis2 and longer in Rep1 than in the
other conditions (P < 0.05). There were no differences across
conditions for other maps.
Source localization suggested that map 6 particularly
strongly activated prefrontal cortex, in particular the medial
orbitofrontal cortex, and the right medial temporal lobe
(parahippocampal gyrus).
Waveform Analysis
Figure 3 shows the analysis of waveforms. Repeated ANOVAs
yielded signiﬁcant interactions of ROI 3 stimulus type in all 3
time widows (4.5 < F8,120 < 10.7; P < 0.0001). Post hoc tests
conﬁrmed the signiﬁcance of the main apparent ﬁndings: At
200--250 ms, Sim1 stimuli (reﬂecting strategic monitoring)
induced the most negative trace over the frontal electrodes, in
contrast to Dis2 stimuli (reﬂecting reality ﬁltering), which
induced the least negative trace in comparison to all other
stimuli. At 300--400 ms, Rep1 stimuli evoked a markedly more
positive wave over frontal electrodes than all other stimuli. At
400--600 ms, Rep1 stimuli appeared to induce a more positive
wave than the other stimuli: Post hoc testing conﬁrmed this
difference except for the comparison with Dis1 stimuli, which,
however, differed from Rep1 stimuli over central and posterior
electrodes.
Sim2 and Rep2 stimuli were not included in the EEG analysis
for the reasons stated in Methods and are only brieﬂy reported
here. Waveform analysis over the frontal electrodes, where the
main differences between the responses to Sim1, Rep1, and
Dis2 occurred, yielded the following observations: At 200--300
ms, Sim2 stimuli induced the same absence of negative
deﬂection (virtually overlaying trace) as Dis2 stimuli suggesting
Table 2
Behavioral results
Run Stimulus type Correct responses Reaction time
(ms)
Run1 Dis1 62.6 ± 0.5 776 ± 141
Sim1 50.6 ± 14.3 1001 ± 153
Rep1 57.9 ± 4.1 780 ± 138
Run2 SimDis2 62.6 ± 0.7 752 ± 117
Dis2 61.9 ± 1.5 795 ± 136
Sim2a 49.8 ± 7.5 1025 ± 155
Rep2a 56.1 ± 5.4 926 ± 119
Note: The second column shows mean ± standard deviation (SD) of correct responses for each
condition (maximum, 63). The third column shows mean of reaction times ± SD in milliseconds
for each condition.
aIndicates stimulus types that did not enter the electrophysiological analysis (Sim2, Rep2).
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Figure 2. Spatiotemporal analysis and source localization. (A) Temporal distribution of the 8 cortical maps obtained from segmentation of the grand mean ERPs within the first
600 ms. Red indicates positivity, and blue indicates negativity. Maps that differed between task conditions are boxed. (B) Distribution of stable map configurations over 600 ms
after stimulus onset in the 5 conditions. The numbers below each segment indicate the most representative map of this period. The amplitude of the curves reflects the GFP.
Colored segments indicate maps with significant differences between task conditions. (C) Results of post hoc tests of the repeated-measures ANOVAs with the 2 factors Maps
and Task condition for maps 2 and 6 regarding GEV and duration of the map. Lines indicate significant differences between 2 conditions. (D) Source localization of maps 2, 5
(which followed map 2), and 6.
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that processing at this (preconscious) stage was dominated by
reality ﬁltering. Rep2 stimuli evoked a trace similar to Rep1
(overlying trace) with the same differences to other stimulus
responses as Rep1 (Fig. 3). At 300--400 ms, Rep2 stimuli induced
a similar positive wave as Rep1 but with an amplitude lying
between Rep1 and the other stimulus types. According to this
intermediate position, their amplitude did not signiﬁcantly
differ from any other stimulus type.
Discussion
This study conﬁrms the dissociation between 2 memory
control processes that have been suspected to be related
(Gilboa et al. 2006). It demonstrates that the ability to judge
whether a stimulus precisely matches a stimulus encountered
in the past (strategic monitoring) dissociates from the ability to
judge whether the memory of a stimulus relates to the present
reality or not (reality ﬁltering). The dissociation appeared both
on behavioral and on electrophysiological levels.
On the behavioral level, the stimulus variations challenging
the 2 processes dissociated. Stimuli resembling previously
presented stimuli within the same run (Sim1) appeared to
challenge maximally strategic monitoring, as reﬂected in
slower and less accurate responses to these stimuli than all
other stimuli. By contrast, presentation of similar, rather than
equal, distracters between the runs facilitated reality ﬁltering,
as reﬂected in faster responses to SimDis2 than Dis2 stimuli.
Thus, the precise matching of memories’ content (strategic
monitoring) is particularly challenging when stimuli resemble
but are not equal to previously seen stimuli, while realizing that
a memory does not apply to present reality (reality ﬁltering) is
particularly challenging when stimuli are equal to, rather than
only similar to, previously seen stimuli.
Electrophysiologically, the 2 processes dissociated at an early
stage: At 200--300 ms, strategic monitoring (processing of
Sim1) induced the strongest expression of a speciﬁc cortical
map conﬁguration (Fig. 2, map 2), while reality ﬁltering
(processing of Dis2) was associated with the weakest expres-
sion of this conﬁguration. In terms of waveforms, strategic
monitoring induced the strongest negative frontal potential,
while reality ﬁltering induced the least negative frontal
deviation of all stimuli (Fig. 3). This result precisely replicates
our previous ﬁndings on reality ﬁltering (Schnider et al. 2002).
Behavioral measures indicated that these electrophysiolog-
ical results truly reﬂect the cognitive processes of interest
rather than unspeciﬁc effects such as, for example, fatigue:
Reaction times did not differ between the runs, and relative
differences of reaction times and error rates among the
stimulus types were similar in both runs (Table 2: run 1, Dis1
< Rep1 < Sim1; run 2, Dis2 < Rep 2 < Sim2).
Figure 3. Waveform analysis. (A) Arrangement of all 128 electrodes. The black dots indicate electrodes included in the 3 ROIs (frontal, central, and posterior). (B) Grand average
ERPs of electrodes included in each ROI in response to the 5 task conditions (Dis1, Sim1, Rep1, SimDis2 and Dis2). Repeated-measures ANOVAs applied on the mean amplitudes
were performed across the 3 time windows boxed in gray: 200--250, 300--400, and 400--600 ms.
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The present observations help to reﬁne the understanding of
the 2 monitoring mechanisms. Strategic retrieval has been
proposed to go through diverse, anatomically distinct stages
(Moscovitch and Melo 1997; Moscovitch and Winocur 2002;
Gilboa et al. 2006). The present study supports this notion:
Strategic retrieval was expressed in 2 time periods with
activation of different brain regions.
In the early period, 200--300 ms, stimuli resembling previously
presented ones (Sim 1) induced a distinct electrocortical
response presumably reﬂecting the detection of the incongru-
ence of the presented stimulus (Sim1) with a previously seen
one (Dis1). Within the strategic retrieval account, the capacity
to make this distinction is called strategic monitoring. A similar
frontal response, also starting at 200 ms, was previously
demonstrated in tasks in which subjects had to distinguish
between pictures they had truly seen in a previous learning
session and items that were perceptually similar to the learned
pictures (Ranganath and Paller 1999; Ecker and Zimmer 2009).
Source estimation indicated that the capacity to detect that
items are only similar to, but not identical with, previously seen
items was associated with particularly strong activation of
visual and adjacent temporo-occipital association cortex (Fig.
2). This activity may reﬂect increased attention in response to
items resembling true repetitions. More elaborate monitoring
of this kind has been shown to activate the lateral prefrontal
cortex (Ranganath et al. 2000), as also predicted by the
strategic retrieval account (Moscovitch and Melo 1997;
Moscovitch and Winocur 2002; Gilboa et al. 2006).
A second period compatible with the strategic retrieval
model occurred at 300--400 ms, in which true repetitions
(Rep1) induced a distinct positive frontal waveform (Fig. 3) and
a speciﬁc map conﬁguration that was not present in response
to other stimuli (Fig. 2). The primary source of this activity was
the bilateral medial orbitofrontal area (Fig. 2). A possible
interpretation of this response is that it reﬂected familiarity, as
opposed to the feeling of novelty evoked by Dis1 stimuli.
However, in earlier studies using continuous recognition tasks,
which did not require stringent content monitoring as the
present task (Schnider et al. 2002; James et al. 2009), true
repetitions only induced discrete amplitude modulations over
posterior electrodes and intensity modulations of electro-
cortical maps at 400--600 ms, rather than the distinct, relatively
early and frontal response evoked in the present task. These
observations indicate that the precise context and difﬁculty of
a task profoundly inﬂuence the electrocortical response to
seemingly equivalent stimuli, such as true repetitions in
differently composed recognition tasks. The speciﬁcity of the
electrophysiological response to real repetitions in the present
study suggests that it reﬂected a signal of conﬁrmation (‘‘yes, it
is a real repetition’’) that is not produced in a simple recog-
nition task. The characteristics of this response would be
compatible with the so-called ‘‘felt-rightness’’ within the
strategic retrieval model, thought to emanate from the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and to signal whether a
recovered memory satisﬁes the goals of the present task
(Moscovitch and Melo 1997; Moscovitch and Winocur 2002;
Gilboa et al. 2006). In any case, our present data show that, in
the context of a difﬁcult recognition task, the recognition of
fake repetitions (Sim1) is electrocortically expressed before
the recognition of true repetitions.
Reality ﬁltering—as reﬂected in the response to Dis2
stimuli—had the same electrophysiological signature as in
our previous study (Schnider et al. 2002; Schnider 2003):
a markedly weaker, almost absent negative deﬂection over
frontal electrodes at 200--300 ms coinciding with a signiﬁ-
cantly weaker expression (virtual absence) of a speciﬁc
electrocortical map conﬁguration present in response to all
other stimulus types. Source estimation indicated that these
ﬁndings reﬂected particularly weak activation of posterior
association areas. These results support the physiological
conclusion already drawn from the previous study (Schnider
2003): Stimuli evoking a memory that does not pertain to
ongoing reality (Dis2), that is, a ‘‘fantasy,’’ appear to skip a
processing stage at 200--300 ms which is characterized by
particularly extensive neocortical activity.
The precise mechanisms of this ﬁltering is not clear, but
available studies suggest the following hypothesis: Filtering of
memories that do not pertain to reality depends on activity of
the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), in particular
area 13 (Schnider, von Da¨niken, et al. 1996a; Schnider and Ptak
1999; Schnider, Treyer, and Buck 2000; Treyer et al. 2006b), and
seems to be mediated by a frontal--subcortical loop connecting
the OFC with the striatum, the substantia nigra, and the medial
thalamus (Treyer et al. 2003). Filtering is under dopaminergic
modulation: In healthy subjects, a hyperdopaminergic state
induced errors with the same pattern as the one observed in
patients confusing reality, namely, increased false positives on
stimuli equivalent to the Dis2 of the present study (Schnider
et al. 2010). Clinical evidence indicated that the OFC
mechanism underlying reality ﬁltering is its ability to signal
that a previously valid anticipation no longer applies, that is,
extinction capacity (Nahum, Ptak, et al. 2009). Extinction in
a simple anticipation--outcome paradigm evoked activity of the
OFC (Schnider, Treyer, and Buck 2005) and was expressed in
the same period (200--300 ms) and by a similar conﬁguration
(absence of frontal negativity) (Schnider et al. 2007) as reality
ﬁltering in the present and our previous studies. In agreement
with this hypothesis, we recently found that medial OFC activity
at 200--300 ms was much more dependent on the behavioral
relevance of the absence of an expected outcome than the sole
absence of reward (Nahum, Gabriel, and Schnider 2011).
How and when precisely the OFC interferes between 200
and 300 ms with the activation of memories is not known.
Source estimation as used here is sensitive to activity in midline
structures (Nahum, Gabriel, et al. 2011) and, indeed, showed
medial OFC activation from 200 ms on (Fig. 2, maps 2 and 5). As
in a previous study (Schnider et al. 2002), Dis2 stimuli induced
particularly weak expression of a stage characterized by
extended temporo-occipital neocortical activation (Fig. 2,
map 2), which was followed by a stage with particularly strong
medial OFC and weak neocortical activation (Fig. 2, map 5),
common to all stimulus types. Our hypothesis is, therefore, that
reality ﬁltering—the detection that an upcoming memory does
not relate to ongoing reality—is conveyed by transient in-
hibition of extended neocortical synchronization between 200
and 300 ms (Schnider 2003, 2008). We suggest that this
transient inhibition is induced by a signal from orbitofrontal
area 13, produced when true reality contradicts the anticipated
outcome (as in extinction trials) (Schnider et al. 2007; Nahum,
Gabriel, and Schnider 2011) and transmitted through frontal--
subcortical connections (Treyer et al. 2003) that are modulated
by dopaminergic neurones (Schnider et al. 2010) known to
respond to the appearance or nonappearance of expected
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outcomes (rewards in animal experimentation) (Schultz and
Dickinson 2000).
The present study indicates that the orbitofrontal reality
ﬁlter reacts to information’s precise content: It is maximally
challenged if a stimulus precisely matches a previously seen
stimulus whose pertinence for ongoing reality has to be
determined (Dis2). Stimuli only resembling previously seen
stimuli (SimDis2) induced a less distinct response than
precisely repeated stimuli. Thus, the perception of current
reality, the ‘‘now,’’ in human thinking apparently rests on the
processing of precise information rather than the gist of
memories: the more precisely current reality resembles a past
reality, the more the orbitofrontal reality ﬁlter will be
challenged.
Albeit logical, this result was not necessarily expected. For
example, the fact that one performs a task (e.g., a memory task)
resembling another one in a similar context already activates
orbitofrontal area 13 (Treyer et al. 2006a), a fact that is
commonly disregarded but may profoundly inﬂuence apparent
activations in functional imaging studies. On anatomical
grounds, high precision of the reality ﬁlter was not necessarily
expected either. There is evidence that a neighboring anterior
limbic structure, the amygdala, reacts to fast but relatively
imprecise (low spatial frequency) information about threaten-
ing stimuli (LeDoux 1996) or fearful faces (Vuilleumier et al.
2003). If the OFC processed information according to similar
criteria as the amygdala, low resolution of orbitofrontal reality
ﬁltering might be expected. However, we recently found that,
although potentially harmful archetypic stimuli like spiders
induced a very strong ERP response around 200 ms, this
response dissociated from the processing of anticipated
outcomes by the OFC (Nahum, Morand, et al. 2009). Thus,
the OFC seems to process events and outcomes according to
different criteria than the neighboring amygdala. In any case,
the present study shows that reality ﬁltering is based on
a precise comparison of memories with present percepts.
The reality ﬁltering paradigm used in our studies bears
superﬁcial resemblance with tasks of exclusion within the
dissociation procedure, that is, the ability to indicate that an
item (a word or picture) was not present in one series but was
rather part of another series (Jacoby 1991). The ability to make
this distinction has also been termed reality or source
monitoring (Johnson and Raye 1981; Johnson et al. 1993),
recency judgment (Mandler 1980; Baddeley and Hitch 1993),
or temporal order memory (Squire et al. 1981; Petrides 1989).
In contrast to the reality ﬁltering disorder determined with our
task, the failure to know explicitly when in the past something
happened does not have a clear clinical correlate. Although it
may be observed in confabulating patients (Schnider, Gutbrod,
et al. 1996), it has no speciﬁcity (Johnson et al. 1997; Schnider
2008); it has also been documented in amnesia without
confabulations or disorientation (Huppert and Piercy 1976;
Squire et al. 1981; Hirst and Volpe 1982; Kopelman et al. 1997)
or after prefrontal lobe damage without amnesia (Janowsky
et al. 1989; Milner et al. 1991; Shimamura et al. 1991; Kesner
et al. 1994; Kopelman et al. 1997). Temporal order tasks
activate the lateral prefrontal, rather than orbitofrontal, cortex
(Zorrilla et al. 1996). Electrophysiologically, old/new effects in
exclusion and temporal order task and context judgments in
source memory tasks are not expressed before 300--400 ms,
often much later (Wilding and Rugg 1996; Herron and Rugg
2003; Dzulkiﬂi and Wilding 2005). Thus, the explicit knowl-
edge about when in the past something happened (exclusion
criterion, recency judgment, temporal order memory) is
clinically, anatomically, and electrophysiologically distinct from
the ability to sense whether a memory relates to ongoing
reality or not (reality ﬁltering).
The present study juxtaposed 2 memory control theories
but does not directly relate to the mechanism of the reality
confusion characterizing behaviorally spontaneous confabula-
tion and disorientation. The reality ﬁlter hypothesis holds that
these disorders result from the failure of an orbitofrontal (area
13) mechanism—akin to or identical with extinction capacity--
that ﬁlters upcoming memories according to their relation with
ongoing reality (Schnider 2008; Nahum, Ptak, et al. 2009). The
increase of false positives from the second run on in diverse
(simpler) versions of the task used in the present experiment
(response to Dis2) has proved to be a highly reliable surrogate
marker of the memory capacity on which these patients fail.
This has been shown in group studies (Schnider, von Da¨niken,
et al. 1996b; Schnider and Ptak 1999) and single case studies
(Ptak and Schnider 1999; Ptak et al. 2001; Schnider, Bonvallat,
et al. 2005; Nahum, Ptak, et al. 2010) on behaviorally
spontaneous confabulation and in a group study on disorien-
tation (Schnider, von Da¨niken, et al. 1996a). Clinical recovery
from behaviorally spontaneous confabulation individually and
speciﬁcally paralleled recovery of the ability to control false
positives in the task (Schnider, Ptak, et al. 2000). In these group
studies, patients were recruited irrespective of the cause of
brain damage (thus avoiding simple effects of disease severity),
were hospitalized at the time of the study (thus allowing us to
verify the presence or absence of reality confusion), and were
matched with regard to the severity of amnesia (similar degree
of delayed free recall deﬁcit); matched in this way, they also did
not differ with regard to general executive dysfunction. False-
positive and false-negative results occurred but were very rare
(discussed in Schnider 2008).
In contradiction to these studies, Gilboa et al. (2006)
observed in their study that only patients having an increase
of false positives both in our reality ﬁlter task and in a task of
strategic content monitoring confabulated; thus, deﬁcient
reality ﬁltering was considered an insufﬁcient mechanism of
behaviorally spontaneous confabulation. Their study included
only patients with OFC damage after rupture of an anterior
communicating artery aneurysm (thus potentially conﬂating
effects of disease severity with failures speciﬁc to confabula-
tion) who mostly lived at home (thus rendering veriﬁcation of
reality confusion delicate) and who were not explicitly
matched on any cognitive measure, such as amnesia. It is,
therefore, possible that their postulate that only the combined
failure of content monitoring and reality ﬁltering induces
behaviorally spontaneous confabulation essentially compen-
sates for the fact that their patients were not matched with
respect to the severity of amnesia or other cognitive deﬁcits.
Indeed, it is not known whether the failure in reality ﬁltering,
as measured with our continuous recognition paradigm, has
any speciﬁc behavioral correlate in brain-damaged subjects
with no amnesia. More intriguingly, severe behaviorally
spontaneous confabulation may occur despite intact perfor-
mance in the known tasks of strategic monitoring (Nahum,
Ptak, et al. 2010). Future studies should include properly
matched patient groups and directly contrast strategic content
monitoring and reality ﬁltering, as in the present study, to
elucidate the relative contribution of these 2 control
2596 Memory Control d Wahlen et al.
mechanisms to the reality confusion evident in behaviorally
spontaneous confabulation and disorientation.
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates behavioral
and electrophysiological dissociation between 2 memory
control mechanisms that have been suggested to be related.
It shows that the veriﬁcation of a memory’s content relies on
different mechanisms than the ability to sense whether
a memory relates to ongoing reality or not.
Funding
Swiss National Science Foundation (320030-132447) to A.S.
Notes
We thank Christoph Michel for helpful comments. Cartool software
was developed by Denis Brunet, supported by the Center for
Biomedical Imaging of Geneva and Lausanne. Conﬂict of Interest :
None declared.
References
Baddeley AD, Hitch G. 1993. The recency effect: implicit learning with
explicit retrieval? Mem Cogn. 21:146--155.
Burgess PW, Shallice T. 1996. Confabulation and the control of
recollection. Memory. 4:359--411.
Dien J, Santuzzi A. 2005. Application of repeated measures ANOVA to
high-density ERP datasets: a review and tutorial. In: Handy T, editor.
Event-related potentials. A methods handbook. Cambridge (MA):
MIT Press. p. 57--82.
Dzulkiﬂi MA, Wilding EL. 2005. Electrophysiological indices of strategic
episodic retrieval processing. Neuropsychologia. 43:1152--1162.
Ecker UK, Zimmer HD. 2009. ERP evidence for ﬂexible adjustment of
retrieval orientation and its inﬂuence on familiarity. J Cogn
Neurosci. 21:1907--1919.
Gilboa A, Alain C, Stuss DT, Melo B, Miller S, Moscovitch M. 2006.
Mechanisms of spontaneous confabulations: a strategic retrieval
account. Brain. 129:1399--1414.
Grave de Peralta Menendez R, Gonzalez Andino S, Lantz G, Michel CM,
Landis T. 2001. Noninvasive localization of electromagnetic
epileptic activity. I. Method descriptions and simulations. Brain
Topogr. 14:131--137.
Grave de Peralta Menendez R, Murray MM, Michel CM, Martuzzi R,
Gonzalez Andino SL. 2004. Electrical neuroimaging based on
biophysical constraints. Neuroimage. 21:527--539.
Herron JE, Rugg MD. 2003. Strategic inﬂuences on recollection in the
exclusion task: electrophysiological evidence. Psychon Bull Rev.
10:703--710.
Hirst W, Volpe BT. 1982. Temporal order judgments with amnesia.
Brain Cogn. 1:294--306.
Huppert FA, Piercy M. 1976. Recognition memory in amnesic patients:
effect of temporal context and familiarity of material. Cortex.
12:3--20.
Jacoby LL. 1991. A process dissociation framework: separating automatic
from intentional uses of memory. J Mem Lang. 30:513--541.
James C, Morand S, Barcellona-Lehmann S, Schnider A. 2009. Neural
transition from short to long term memory: an ERP study.
Hippocampus. 19:371--378.
Janowsky JS, Shimamura AP, Squire LR. 1989. Source memory
impairment in patients with frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia.
27:1043--1056.
Johnson MK, Hashtroudi S, Lindsay DS. 1993. Source monitoring.
Psychol Bull. 114:3--28.
Johnson MK, O’Connor M, Cantor J. 1997. Confabulation, memory
deﬁcits, and frontal dysfunction. Brain Cogn. 34:189--206.
Johnson MK, Raye CL. 1981. Reality monitoring. Psychol Rev. 88:67--85.
Kesner RP, Hopkins RO, Fineman B. 1994. Item and order dissociation
in humans with prefrontal damage. Neuropsychologia. 32:881--889.
Kopelman MD, Stanhope N, Kingsley D. 1997. Temporal and spatial
context memory in patients with focal frontal, temporal lobe, and
diencephalic lesions. Neuropsychologia. 35:1533--1545.
LeDoux J. 1996. The emotional brain. The mysterious underpinnings of
emotional life.. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Mandler G. 1980. Recognizing: the judgement of previous occurrence.
Psychol Rev. 87:252--271.
Melo B, Winocur G, Moscovitch M. 1999. False recall and false
recognition: an examination of the effects of selective and
combined lesions to the medial temporal lobe/diencephalon and
frontal lobe structures. Cogn Neuropsychiatry. 16:343--359.
Metcalf K, Langdon R, Coltheart M. 2007. Models of confabulation: a
critical review and a new framework. Cogn Neuropsychiatry.
24:23--47.
Michel C, Koenig T, Brandeis D. 2009. Electrical neuroimaging in the
time domain. In: Michel C, Koenig T, Brandeis D, Gianotti L,
Wackermann J, editors. Electrical neuroimaging. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press. p. 111--143.
MichelCM,MurrayMM, LantzG,Gonzalez S, Spinelli L, Grave de Peralta R.
2004. EEG source imaging. Clin Neurophysiol. 115:2195--2222.
Michel CM, Thut G, Morand S, Khateb A, Pegna AJ, Grave de Peralta R,
Gonzalez S, Seeck M, Landis T. 2001. Electric source imaging of
human brain functions. Brain Res Brain Res Rev. 36:108--118.
Milner B, Corsi P, Leonard G. 1991. Frontal-lobe contribution to recency
judgements. Neuropsychologia. 29:601--618.
Mitchell KJ, Johnson MK. 2009. Source monitoring 15 years later: what
have we learned from fMRI about the neural mechanisms of source
memory? Psychol Bull. 135:638--677.
Moscovitch M. 1989. Confabulation and the frontal systems: strategic
versus associative retrieval in neuropsychological theories of
memory. In: Roediger HLI, Craik FIM, editors. Varieties of memory
and consciousness. Essays in the honour of Endel Tulving. Hillsdale
(NJ): Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. p. 133--160.
Moscovitch M, Melo B. 1997. Strategic retrieval and the frontal lobes:
evidence from confabulation and amnesia. Neuropsychologia. 35:
1017--1034.
Moscovitch M, Winocur G. 2002. The frontal cortex and working with
memory. In: Stuss DT, Knight RT, editors. Principles of frontal lobe
function. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 188--209.
Murray MM, Brunet D, Michel CM. 2008. Topographic ERP analyses:
a step-by-step tutorial review. Brain Topogr. 20:249--264.
Nahum L, Gabriel D, Schnider A. 2011. Human processing of
behaviorally relevant and irrelevant absence of expected rewards:
a high-resolution ERP study. PLoS One. 2011 Jan 27; 6(1):e16173.
Nahum L, Gabriel D, Spinelli L, Momjian S, Seeck M, Michel C,
Schnider A. 2010. Rapid consolidation and the human hippocampus:
intracranial recordings conﬁrm surface EEG. Hippocampus. doi:
10.1002/hipo.20819.
Nahum L, Morand S, Barcellona-Lehmann S, Schnider A. 2009.
Instinctive modulation of cognitive behavior: a human evoked
potential study. Hum Brain Mapp. 30:2120--2131.
Nahum L, Ptak R, Leemann B, Lalive P, Schnider A. 2010. Behaviorally
spontaneous confabulation in limbic encephalitis: the roles of strategic
monitoring and reality ﬁltering. J Int Neuropsychol Soc. 16:995--1005.
Nahum L, Ptak R, Leemann B, Schnider A. 2009. Disorientation,
confabulation, and extinction capacity. Clues on how the brain
creates reality. Biol Psychiatry. 65:966--972.
Pascual-Marqui RD, Michel CM, Lehmann D. 1995. Segmentation of
brain electrical activity into microstates: model estimation and
validation. IEEE Trans Biomed Eng. 42:658--665.
Perrin F, Pernier J, Bertrand O, Giard MH, Echallier JF. 1987. Mapping of
scalp potentials by surface spline interpolation. Electroencephalogr
Clin Neurophysiol. 66:75--81.
Petrides M. 1989. Frontal lobes and memory. In: Boller F, Grafman J,
editors. Handbook of neuropsychology. vol. 3. New York: Elsevier
Science Publishers. p. 75--90.
Ptak R, Birtoli B, Imboden H, Hauser C, Weis J, Schnider A. 2001.
Hypothalamic amnesia with spontaneous confabulations: a clinico-
pathologic study. Neurology. 56:1597--1600.
Ptak R, Schnider A. 1999. Spontaneous confabulations after orbito-
frontal damage: the role of temporal context confusion and self-
monitoring. Neurocase. 5:243--250.
Cerebral Cortex November 2011, V 21 N 11 2597
Ranganath C, Johnson MK, D’Esposito M. 2000. Left anterior prefrontal
activation increases with demands to recall speciﬁc perceptual
information. J Neurosci. 20:RC108 (101--105).
Ranganath C, Paller KA. 1999. Frontal brain potentials during
recognition are modulated by requirements to retrieve perceptual
detail. Neuron. 22:605--613.
Schnider A. 2003. Spontaneous confabulation and the adaptation of
thought to ongoing reality. Nat Rev Neurosci. 4:662--671.
Schnider A. 2008. The confabulating mind. How the brain creates
reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schnider A, Bonvallat J, Emond H, Leemann B. 2005. Reality confusion in
spontaneous confabulation. Neurology. 65:1117--1119.
Schnider A, Guggisberg A, Nahum L, Gabriel D, Morand S. 2010.
Dopaminergic modulation of rapid reality adaptation in thinking.
Neuroscience. 167:583--587.
Schnider A, Gutbrod K, Hess CW, Schroth G. 1996. Memory without
context. Amnesia with confabulations following right capsular genu
infarction. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry. 61:186--193.
Schnider A, Mohr C, Morand S, Michel CM. 2007. Early cortical response
to behaviorally relevant absence of anticipated outcomes: a human
event-related potential study. NeuroImage. 35:1348--1355.
Schnider A, Ptak R. 1999. Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress
currently irrelevant memory traces. Nat Neurosci. 2:677--681.
Schnider A, Ptak R, von Da¨niken C, Remonda L. 2000. Recovery from
spontaneous confabulations parallels recovery of temporal confu-
sion in memory. Neurology. 55:74--83.
Schnider A, Treyer V, Buck A. 2000. Selection of currently relevant
memories by the human posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex.
J Neurosci. 20:5880--5884.
Schnider A, Treyer V, Buck A. 2005. The human orbitofrontal cortex
monitors outcomes even when no reward is at stake. Neuro-
psychologia. 43:316--323.
Schnider A, Valenza N, Morand S, Michel CM. 2002. Early cortical
distinction between memories that pertain to ongoing reality and
memories that don’t. Cereb Cortex. 12:54--61.
Schnider A, von Da¨niken C, Gutbrod K. 1996a. Disorientation in
amnesia: a confusion of memory traces. Brain. 119:1627--1632.
Schnider A, von Da¨niken C, Gutbrod K. 1996b. The mechanisms
of spontaneous and provoked confabulations. Brain. 119:
1365--1375.
Schultz W, Dickinson A. 2000. Neuronal coding of prediction errors.
Annu Rev Neurosci. 23:473--500.
Shimamura AP, Janowsky JS, Squire LR. 1991. What is the role of frontal
lobe damage in memory disorders?. In: Levin HS, Eisenberg HM,
Benton AL, editors. Frontal lobe function and dysfunction. New
York: Oxford University Press. p. 173--195.
Squire LR, Nadel L, Slater PC. 1981. Anterograde amnesia and memory
for temporal order. Neuropsychologia. 19:141--145.
Treyer V, Buck A, Schnider A. 2003. Orbitofrontal-subcortical loop
activation during suppression of memories that do not pertain to
ongoing reality. J Cogn Neurosci. 15:610--618.
Treyer V, Buck A, Schnider A. 2006a. Effects of baseline task position on
apparent activation in functional imaging of memory. Neuro-
psychologia. 44:462--468.
Treyer V, Buck A, Schnider A. 2006b. Selection of currently relevant
words: an auditory verbal memory study using PET. Neuroreport.
17:323--327.
Vuilleumier P, Armony JL, Driver J, Dolan RJ. 2003. Distinct spatial
frequency sensitivities for processing faces and emotional expres-
sions. Nat Neurosci. 6:624--631.
Wilding EL, Rugg MD. 1996. An event-related potential study of
recognition memory with and without retrieval of source. Brain.
119:889--905.
Zorrilla LT, Aguirre GK, Zarahn E, Cannon TD, D’Esposito M. 1996.
Activation of the prefrontal cortex during judgments of recency:
a functional MRI study. Neuroreport. 7:2803--2806.
2598 Memory Control d Wahlen et al.
